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Sunshine

Law-COURT WILL NOT FIND VIOLATION OF LAW WHERE
"AN APPEARANCE OF PREJUDGMENT" EXISTS BUT No EVIDENCE
OF SECRET MEETINGS APPEARS IN THE RECORD; MEMBERS OF A PUBLIC BODY
MAY CONSULT THEIR STAFF IN PRIVATE FOR ADVICE ON PENDING IS-

SUES-Occidental Chemical Co. v. Mayo, 351 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1977).
On July 22, 1975, the Florida Public Service Commission granted
a rate increase to Florida Power Corporation.' The commission's
order followed fifteen days of public hearings and oral argument,
during which one of the primary issues discussed was the manner
in which a rate hike would be levied against customers if approved.
Occidental Chemical Company, an intervening highload factor customer of Florida Power,' argued that any rate hike should be divided
among customer classes in direct proportion to the cost of delivering

electricity to those classes.' Florida Power, however, contended that
the increase should be divided ratably among customer
classes-that is, in proportion to the rates which were then in effect.4
This ratable division was more costly to Occidental.
At the close of all the evidence on June 19, 1975, Florida Power
and Occidental each requested that they be furnished copies of the
commission staff's recommendations before submitting their respective briefs.' The commission denied this motion but did agree
not to receive a copy of the recommendations until an agenda conference on July 22. At that time, all interested parties would also
be given a copy of the recommendations.'
No public meetings were held between the close of all the evidence on June 19 and the agenda conference one month later. At
that conference, the commission and all parties received for the first
time a copy of the staff's recommendations, which were in the form
of a twenty-two and one-half page proposed order.7 This proposal
discussed virtually all the issues which had been raised during the
public hearings and recommended granting Florida Power a rate
1. Florida Power Corp., No. 74807-EU (Fla. PSC July 22, 1975) (Order No. 6794).
2. The commission granted Occidental leave to intervene in the rate hike hearings on
January 7, 1975, by Order No. 6440.
3. Brief for Petitioner at 13. Such a plan would have resulted in a smaller rate hike for
Occidental. The cost of delivery of a specified amount of electricity to a single site is less than
the cost of delivery of the same amount to many sites.
4. Brief for Intervenor Florida Power Corp. at 26. Florida Power argued that the cost of
service would be too difficult to determine and that dividing up the rate increase in this way
would place too great a burden on the residential customer. Id.
5. Brief for Petitioner at 32.
6. Id. at 34.
7. Id.
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increase and allocating it ratably among customer classes.8 The
commission adopted the proposed order verbatim after a scant
ninety minutes of consideration.' The next day, the commission
issued an order granting Florida Power a rate hike to be apportioned
ratably. 10 The allocation question by itself had not been discussed
at the agenda conference, where only commissioners and their staff
were entitled to speak."
Occidental filed for a writ of certiorari in the Florida Supreme
Court.'2 The company alleged that the Public Service Commission
had violated Florida's "government in the sunshine law"
("Sunshine Law") in promulgating the rate increase order. 3 Occidental maintained that the commission had violated the Sunshine
Law either by meeting secretly to decide how it would handle the
rate hike request or by delegating decisionmaking authority to its
staff."' The petitioner therefore asked the court to invalidate the
order. 5 The commission replied that, on the record before the court,
it was reasonable to assume that the commissioners had reached
8. Id.
9. Two inconsequential language changes were made. Occidental Chem. Co. v. Mayo, 351
So. 2d 336, 339 n.3 (Fla. 1977).
10. The final order was 28 pages long. The commission did not adopt the last five pages
of the order at the agenda conference, and it is not clear when they were added. The court
noted this difficulty but did not resolve the question, stating that the parties had not properly
presented the issue. Id. at 342-43. However, Occidental raised this point in its brief and
labeled the contents of these last five pages a "focal point" of its objections. Brief for Petitioner at 36.
11. Brief for Petitioner at 35.
12. 351 So. 2d at 338 n.1.
13. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1977). The statute provides:
(1) All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority or
of any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation or any political
subdivision, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, at which official acts
are to be taken are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times,
and no resolution, rule, regulation, or formal action shall be considered binding
except as taken or made at such meeting.
(2) The minutes of a meeting of any such board or commission of any such state
agency or authority shall be promptly recorded and such records shall be open to
public inspection. The circuit courts of this state shall havte jurisdiction to issue
injunctions to enforce the purposes of this section upon application by any citizen
of this state.
(3) Any person who is a member of a board or commission or of any state agency
or authority of any county, municipal corporation or any political subdivision who
violates the provisions of this section by attending a meeting not held in accordance
with the provisions hereof is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
Id.
14. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 20.
15. 351 So. 2d at 338. No formal action of a state board or commission is binding unless
the body complied with the Sunshine Law in taking the action. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (1977).
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independent judgments individually on the many issues involved in
ratemaking and that in so doing the commissioners were privileged
to call on staff members for legal advice or for an amplification of
facts.'
The court held for the Public Service Commission in a four to two
decision. The court concluded that, although the circumstances surrounding adoption of the staff's proposed order "created an appearance of pre-judgment," no specific evidence in the record showed a
deliberate violation of the Sunshine Law. 7 Moreover, the court did
not disapprove of the role that the commission's staff played in the
proceedings, even though the staff actually wrote the body of the
final order and arrived at its conclusions during private, closed
meetings.
To appreciate fully the significance of Occidental Chemical Co.
v. Mayo, 9 it is necessary to look at the history of judicial interpretation of Florida's Sunshine Law. The result in Occidental is surprising in the light of that history, for Florida courts previously
have consistently construed the statute in broad and comprehensive
terms. Florida's open-government law has become possibly the
strongest in the nation since its enactment in 1967, primarily because of judicial decisions. 0
The statute itself is vague and very broad. 21 Thus, the first few
court tests were crucial to its validity. The first appellate decision
concerning the scope of the statute was rendered in 1969 in Times
Publishing Co. v. Williams.2 2 The Second District Court of Appeal
held in Times that the legislature intended to enact a very broad
statute, applicable to "every board or commission. ' 23 Actually, this
is little more than a recitation of the words of the statute. The
importance of the Times decision lies in the judicial finding that the
legislation was aimed at the decisionmaking process itself, and not
16. 351 So. 2d at 342.
17. Id. at 341-42.
18. Id. at 342.
19. 351 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1977).
20. See Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 1070 (1971); Wickham, Let the Sun Shine In!, 68 Nw. UL.
REv. 480, 491 (1973).
21. For the text of the statute, see note 13 supra. Because of its vagueness and breadth,
there has been criticism of the draftsmanship. See, e.g., Kalil, FloridaSunshine Law, 49 FLA.
B.J. 72 (1975); Note, Government in the Sunshine: JudicialApplication and Suggestions for
Reform, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 537 (1974). These articles suggest that the statute should contain
a definition of its terms and a specific list of exceptions.
22. 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
23. Id. at 473. The judge in the case, Woodie Liles, was later public counsel for the citizens
of the State of Florida in rate hearings before the Public Service Commission. In that capacity, he filed a brief in Occidental adopting the petitioner's position on the sunshine issue.
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merely at "formal action" such as voting.24
The Times court found that any "acts of deliberation,discussion
and deciding" were covered by the statute. 5 Therefore, the court
held that the Pinellas County School Board was "without power"
to hold even "informal" meetings which were closed to the public."6
In so doing, the court rejected the school board's argument that it
could meet behind closed doors to discuss personnel matters or to
consult its attorney on all legal matters.27 The court noted that the
Sunshine Law provided for no exceptions and held that this mandate would stand in the absence of a constitutional impediment.s
The Florida Supreme Court adopted the essence of the Times
holding later that same year in Board of Public Instruction v.
9 This case involved
Doran."
routine closed-door gatherings of a
county school board in which the board received information and
began to formulate opinions about matters to be considered at later
formal meetings. In upholding the Sunshine Law against constitutional attack, the Doran court held that any gathering of members
of a board or commission is a meeting covered by the statute if, at
the gathering, the members "deal with" any matter on which the
board or commission might foreseeably act.30 The court enjoined the
3
school board from holding any further private meetings. '
Together, Doran and Times require that all gatherings of a board
or commission be open to the public if the board or commission
24. Id.
25. Id. at 474.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 474-75.
28. Id. at 474; see FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (1977). The court found that a narrow exception
to the Sunshine Law existed, based on such a constitutional infringement. The court stated
that since the Florida constitution gives the Florida Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction over
the disciplining of attorneys, an attorney has no duty to obey the statute when obedience
would clearly conflict with a specific ethical canon. 222 So. 2d at 475.
29. 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969).
30. Id. at 698-99. The defendant board contended that the statute was so vague and
ambiguous that it violated the board's due process rights. To meet this challenge, the court
looked to Turk v. Richard, 47 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1950), a case construing an earlier and very
limited open-government law. In Turk, the court had defined the term "all meetings" to
include only formal assemblages. The Dorancourt noted that the legislature is charged with
a knowledge of case law. Thus, the court reasoned that the Sunshine Law, enacted 17 years
after Turk was decided, would only have spoken to "all meetings" if only formal assemblages
were meant to be covered. Instead, the court observed, the Sunshine Law also included the
term "public meetings." Since this language would be unnecessary (in light of Turk) if only
formal action was meant to take place in the sunshine, its inclusion was an indication of
legislative intent and so made the law sufficiently clear to avoid violations of due process.
This strained reasoning is an obvious example of the judiciary's zealous protection of the
Sunshine Law.
31. 224 So. 2d at 699-700.
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takes any step toward deciding a matter on which formal action
might foreseeably be taken at some future date. In 1971, the Florida
Supreme Court reviewed this standard in City of Miami Beach v.
Berns.32 The Berns court fully embraced the Doran "foreseeable
action" test and reinforced its position that the law was intended
to be both broad and comprehensive. The court then affirmed the
district court of appeal's decision to enjoin the Miami Beach City
Council from holding private meetings about such sensitive issues
as personnel matters and pending litigation." The court noted that
the legislature had not amended the Sunshine Law to limit the
comprehensive application given it by the courts and proceeded to
"emphasize" the "foreseeable action" test.Y In addition, the Berns
court reiterated the principle announced in Doran that no exceptions to the law existed other than those based on constitutional
provisions."
The supreme court finally recognized an exception to the Sunshine Law in 1972 in Bassett v. Braddock.3 Bassett involved private
meetings between labor negotiators and a teachers' association, and
between the negotiators and the school board. The Bassett court
observed that the right to bargain collectively is guaranteed to public employees by the Florida constitution and that such preliminary
meetings are essential to the exercise of that right. 7 Since public
attendance could diminish the effectiveness of such meetings, the
court held that they were exempt from the Sunshine Law. Nevertheless, the court also discussed the practical aspects of applying the
Sunshine Law, and it has been suggested that the Bassett decision
32. 245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971).
33. The sensitive nature of meetings at which personnel problems are considered has been
cited as an argument against the Sunshine Law, and there have been proposals to exempt
meetings dealing with such problems for open-government statutes.
The Jacksonville City Council also had problems with the law. In Jones v. Tanzler, 238
So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1970), the Florida Supreme Court discharged a writ of certiorari as improvidently issued and let stand a lower court decision that the Sunshine Law was not violated
by an alleged secret meeting of some members of the city council. Concurring, Justices
Roberts and Adkins noted that the meeting in question concerned an assessment which was
involved in a bond validation proceeding. Both justices said that the proper forum for adjudication of the question raised on appeal was in the validation case which was being decided
by a lower tribunal when the Jones case came before the court. In his special concurrence,
Justice Adkins stressed that the substantive defenses raised by the city would not circumvent
the law; specifically, he stated that mere absence of a quorum could not legitimize a private
meeting of public officials. Id. at 92-93. (The case has little precedential value, though,
because of the unusual circumstances surrounding the dismissal of the writ of certiorari.)
34. 245 So. 2d at 40.
35. Id. at 41.
36. 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972).
37. Id. at 426; see FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
38. Every action emanates from thoughts and creations of the mind and ex-
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was based primarily on policy grounds. 9
Any thought that Bassett signaled a general retreat from the
court's hard-line stand on the Sunshine Law was put to rest the
40 The
following year in Canney v. Board of Public Instruction.
Canney court refused to carve out another major exception to the
law and reversed a district court of appeal's holding that boards
acting in a "quasi-judicial" capacity need not open their meetings
to the public. Canney dealt with private deliberations of a school
board concerning disciplinary action against a student. The lower
court had reasoned that, once a board began to function as a quasijudicial body, it was just as exempt from the Sunshine Law as any
court in the state.4 The supreme court, however, held that the legislature could freely prescribe the procedures to be followed by a
legislatively created quasi-judicial body. The court was apparently
concerned that the "quasi-judicial" exception, if allowed to stand,
would be the subject of abuse. As Justice Adkins stated for the
majority, "A county school board should not be authorized to
avoid the Government in the Sunshine Law by making its own
determination that an act is quasi-judicial."4 2 So, after Canney, any
legislatively created board was subject to the Sunshine Law, regard3
less of its function.4
changes with others. These are perhaps "deliberations" in a sense but hardly demanded to be brought forward . . . at a public meeting. To carry matters to such
an extreme approaches the ridiculous; it would defeat any meaningful and productive process of government.
262 So. 2d at 428.
39. Kalil, supra note 21, at 75; Comment, Government in the Sunshine: Another Cloud
on the Horizon, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 603 (1973). For a lengthy discussion of cases involving the
Sunshine Law and collective bargaining, see a forthcoming article, McHugh, The Florida
Experience in Public Employee Collective Bargaining,1974-1978: Bellwether for the South,
(1978).
6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 40. 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973).
41. Canney v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 231 So. 2d 34, 39 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970),
rev'd, 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973). The attorney general had taken essentially the same position. 1971 FLA. Op. Arr'v GEN. 071-32.
42. 278 So. 2d at 263.
43. But see State Dep't of Pollution Control v. State Career Serv. Comm'n, 320 So. 2d
846 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975), which is in direct conflict with Canney. The Career Service
Commission is a body to which state employees may appeal disciplinary decisions by their
employers. The district court of appeal noted that the commission has 30 days in which to
decide a case after a public hearing on the merits. The court held that the commission acts
as a quasi-judicial body in such matters and that, as such, its deliberations are exempt from
the Sunshine Law. The fact situation in State CareerServ. Comm'n was similar to that in
Canney, in which the school board recessed to deliberate in private after holding a public
hearing. Yet the district court of appeal totally ignored Canney. Perhaps the court simply
felt that matters coming before the Career Service Commission were too sensitive to be open
to public scrutiny. At any rate, Canney is still the rule. Occidental Chem. Co. v. Mayo, 351
So. 2d at 341 n.7; 1976 FLA. Op. ATT'y GEN. 076-225, at 10.
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Obviously, the holding in Occidental is contrary to this pattern
of strong judicial support for a very broad interpretation of the
Sunshine Law. Before looking at Occidental in detail, however, it
is important to examine the line of decisions which deal specifically
with the applicability of the Sunshine Law to advisory bodies.
Bigelow v. Howze presented the first such decision in 1974." In
Bigelow, two of the five members of the Charlotte County Commission were appointed to a four-member fact-finding committee. The
committee was supposed to investigate the previous work of two
firms in order to facilitate the selection of one of the firms to do
reappraisal work for the county. The committee traveled to Tennessee on its fact-finding mission. While there, the two commissioners
discussed what recommendation they would make to the full commission. The Second District Court of Appeal held this discussion
to be a violation of the Sunshine Law even though the full commission considered the recommendation later in a public meeting. The
two commissioners should only have discussed possible recommendations in a public meeting, the court concluded. Bigelow marked
some progress toward applying the Sunshine Law to advisory
boards. But the precedential value of the case was unclear because
of the dual roles of the two committee/commission members.
In 1974, the applicability of the Sunshine Law to advisory bodies
5 Gradison inwas extended in Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison.1
volved a town council's attempt to revise local zoning ordinances.
The council appointed a committee of lay citizens to aid professional planners in devising a new comprehensive zoning plan. The
citizen's committee was to make tentative decisions as an
"element" of the zoning commission and guide the professional
planners in their efforts to produce a plan consistent with the overall
land use goals of the town. This committee, however, had no authority to bind either the zoning commission or the town council by its
decisions."6 The committee's meetings were closed to the public.47 Its
recommendations were submitted to the zoning authority and subjected to public debate for five days. The zoning authority adopted
the recommendations of the committee and later sent the entire
comprehensive plan to the town council. After six days of hearings,
the council approved the plan. 8
44. 291 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
45. 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974).
46. Id. at 474-75.
47. IDS Properties, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 279 So. 2d 353, 355 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974).
48. Id. at 359.
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A group of citizens sought to have the comprehensive plan invalidated on the ground that the citizen's committee was subject to the
Sunshine Law. The trial court refused, emphasizing the purely advisory status of the committee. The Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that the recommendations of the committee were
one step of the decisionmaking process, and, as such, were within
the Doran "foreseeable action" test.'" The Florida Supreme Court
affirmed. For the majority, Chief Justice Adkins explained:
Few, if any, governmental boards or agencies deliberately attempt to circumvent the government in the sunshine law. We feel
that the Town Council of Palm Beach acted in good faith, but any
committee established by the Town Council to act in any type of
advisory capacity would be subject to the provisions of the government in the sunshine law. 50
The Gradisoncourt noted that the committee had been delegated
5
functions which were normally exercised by the town council itself. '
Presumably, the court was speaking of the committee's suggestions
to the professional zoners relating to the overall land use goals of the
Town of Palm Beach. According to the court, this delegation raised
the committee's status to that of a board or commission and subjected the committee to the Sunshine Law.52 The court seemed to
it could base a decision
be straining to find legal ground upon which
53
reasons.
policy
for
important
deemed
it
One other case on this issue was decided at the appellate level
before Occidental reached the supreme court. In 1967, the Second
District Court of Appeal decided Bennett v. Warden, which involved closed meetings between the president of St. Petersburg Junior College and representatives of career employees at the college.54
The president also served as executive officer of the Board of Trustees. In that capacity, he selected the representatives to act as his
49. Id. at 357.
50. 296 So. 2d at 476.
51. Id. at 475.
52. Id.
53. No governmental board is infallible and it is foolish to assume that those
who are elected or appointed to office have any superior knowledge concerning any
governmental problem. Every person charged with the administration of any governmental activity must rely upon suggestions and ideas advanced by other knowledgeable and interested persons. As more people participate in governmental activities, the decision-making process will be improved.
Id. at 476. In addition, the court cited cases from five other jurisdictions which dealt with
what the scope of open-government laws should be. Id. at 476-77.
54. 333 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
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advisors on issues relating to working conditions at the college. Any
recommendations made by the president had to be approved first
by an administrative council and then by the Board of Trustees.
Both these groups met "in the sunshine" as a matter of course.55 The
court held that the meetings between the president and the career
employees' representatives were not subject to the Sunshine Law
because these meetings were too far removed from the decisionmaking process to play an important role in shaping final decisions
relating to working conditions at the college."
Occidentalfollowed. The petitioner there asserted that the Public
Service Commission must have violated the Sunshine Law in one
of two ways: (1) the commissioners had held secret meetings to
decide how to dispose of the rate hike request; or (2) they had
delegated decisionmaking authority to the commission staff, and
thus, under Gradison, raised the status of the staff to that of a board
or commission subject to the Sunshine Law. Otherwise, Occidental
contended, the commission could not have passed on a twenty-two
and one-half page document covering such complex issues after a
mere ninety minutes of consideration."
Discussing the first point, the court acknowledged that the evidence created "an appearance of pre-judgment" but refused to invalidate the commission's order for that reason alone." The court
noted that the record contained no evidence of secret meetings or
other attempts to circumvent the Sunshine Law and concluded that
in such circumstances it would not speculate as to what had occurred." This reasoning presents a major hurdle to effective enforcement of the law. Quite often, no evidence of secret meetings will
exist. Obviously, officials at such meetings will attempt to avoid
documenting their deeds. They will try to keep their secret meetings
secret. As Justice Adkins said in his dissent in Occidental:
The fact that no specific meeting date of the Commission and/or
its staff appears in the record does not preclude this Court's finding
a lack of compliance with the government in the sunshine law. It
is sufficient that the surrounding circumstances clearly indicate
that action tantamount to finalization was taken out of the sunshine. 0
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 100.

Id.
351 So. 2d at 341.
Id.
Id. at 341-42.
Id. at 344.
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This problem is compounded by the fact that the supreme court
refuses to look beyond the record when considering a case by means
of certiorari." Yet the record is prepared by the agency which has
allegedly violated the law."2 In Occidental, the petitioning company
asked the Public Service Commission to complete the record with
minutes, notes, or summaries of all communications between commissioners and between the commissioners and their staff.63 The
commission denied this motion.64 Occidental then asked the supreme court for an order requiring the commission to submit such
evidence to the court. In a footnote to the opinion, the court denied
this motion, stating that the rule under which Occidental had
moved was not intended "to cure record omissions fatal to the points
urged on appeal, or to broaden the scope of review to matters not
considered by the lower tribunal."6 5
Thus, one who complains that a commission has held secret meetings may be trapped in a "Catch 22" situation: the court requires
proof of the meetings, but the court will not look beyond the record
to find the needed proof if review is by certiorari. And, if the commission refuses to include in the record evidence that may prove a
violation of the Sunshine Law, the court will not compel it to do so."
The Occidental court initially rejected the notion that all meetings between commissioners and their staff must be open to the
public. Citing Bennett, the court stated flatly, "[t]he Commission's staff is not subject to the law." 67 Apparently, however, this
61.

Id. at 342 n.11. Certiorari is the correct method of obtaining review of a Public Service
CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3); FLA. STAT. §§ 120.68(2), 366.10 (1977); see
Citizens of Fla. v. Mayo, 324 So. 2d 35, 37 (Fla. 1975) (listing authority for the Florida
Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review orders of the Public Service Commission in utility rate
cases). Section 366.10 was repealed by Act of June 17, 1976, ch. 76-168, § 3, 1976 Fla. Laws
295 (uncodified), effective July 1, 1980.
62. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(5) (1977); see Mick v. Florida State Bd. of Dentistry, 338 So. 2d
1297 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (suggesting that an agency "should" include in the record
the materials which petitioner suggests be included).
63. Petitioner's Motion to Complete Record, Florida Power Corp., No. 74807-EU (Fla.
PSC Aug. 22, 1975).
64. Denial of Motion to Complete Record (Oct. 20, 1975).
65. 351 So. 2d at 341 n.9. The court incorrectly states: "We denied this motion." Id. The
court actually had not previously ruled on the motion, and "denied" should read "deny." Of
course it is foolish to speak of the issue of violation of the Sunshine Law as not being
considered by the lower tribunal in this case: Occidental could not have known that the
commission might have violated the Sunshine Law until the summary disposition of the rate
hike request at the agenda conference. The proceedings were then closed, giving Occidental
no opportunity to raise the issue before the "lower tribunal."
66. The court noted that communications between staff and commissioners can presumably be challenged as violating the Sunshine Law at the administrative level by appropriate
motion or petition. Id. But if the court will not require the commission to comply, these
challenges, as in Occidental, will be completely ineffectual.
67. Id. at 341.

Commission order. FLA.
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broad edict does not mean that a staff would never be subject to the
law: Occidental's delegation argument was rejected on evidentiary
grounds. If Bennett is to be used as a guide, the statement probably
means that the staff may be used as fact-finders and legal advisers
so long as the staff is sufficiently removed from the decisionmaking
process. This is precisely the role that the Public Service Commission suggested its staff played in promulgation of the order in
Occidental. Since the court does not disapprove of this role, it must
be assumed that a staff's exemption from the Sunshine Law covers
at least this kind of activity. Indeed, the Occidental court stated
that members of a collegial body need not avoid their staffs when
considering an issue. 8 Few would disagree with this proposition. But"
Occidental's argument was that the commissioners either met privately (with or without their staff present) or delegated their decisionmaking authority to the staff. Thus, the precedential value of
the court's pronouncement on this issue is difficult to discern.
After rejecting Occidental's "broad brush" argument that all
meetings between the commission and its staff were subject to the
Sunshine Law, the court proceeded to discuss Occidental's more
narrow argument: that on these facts some delegation of authority
must have taken place, thus subjecting the staff to the Sunshine
Law under the Gradisonrule. The court noted that the staff actually
wrote twenty-two and one-half pages of the proposed order and
apparently agreed that some delegation did occur. But, instead of
addressing the issue squarely, the court merely stated that Gradison
did not control."9
The only reason the court gave for this conclusion was that in
Gradison the "record adequately established that the town council
had created a citizens committee to serve as its alter ego, and that
the council later gave summary approval to the committee's recommendations in a purely ceremonial public meeting."70 But it can
easily be argued that the Public Service Commission staff was as
much an "alter ego" of the commission in Occidental as the citizens
committee was of the town council in Gradison. And surely the
approval was no less ceremonial in Occidentalthan in Gradison.In
Gradison, the committee's proposals were subjected to five days of
public debate in front of the zoning authority and then to six more
days of hearings before the town council. In Occidental, no public
debate was allowed on the proposed order, and the hearing lasted
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 342.
Id.
Id.
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only ninety minutes. Yet the Occidental court made no other attempt to distinguish the cases.
The court's failure to follow the Gradison rule in Occidental may
have the effect of limiting Gradisonto its facts. Once again the court
failed to set a standard for determining when an advisory body will
become subject to the Sunshine Law. 7'
One other troublesome aspect of Occidental is the court's implication that even the long-standing Doran-Berns "foreseeable action"
test might be abrogated in the near future. In a footnote, the court
stated that "[t]his case does not present a proper occasion . . . for
us to determine whether all private collegial discussions among
commissioners become decision-making acts which must occur in
public."7" Is this not precisely what the "foreseeable action" test was
meant to determine? It is interesting to note that the court invites
the reader to "contrast" Times with Gradison on this issue but
ignores the two leading supreme court cases on point: Doran and
Berns.7 3 Has the "foreseeable action" test been abandoned? The
answer, apparently, will come at the first "proper occasion."
The decision in Occidental has certainly damaged the effectiveness of the Sunshine Law. By requiring proof of alleged secret meetings, the court has made enforcement of the law much more difficult
in cases of intentional violations. Perhaps few officials will risk the
criminal penalties which may result from such violations.7 4 If so, the
importance of this aspect of the decision may not be great. But
more extensive damage was done by the court's retreat from
Gradison. Advisory bodies may now meet in private, even if they
play a substantial role in the decisionmaking process. At what point
they become subject to the Sunshine Law is totally unclear. Finally,
the court hinted that it may soon allow members of an administrative body to meet behind closed doors when discussing matters
under official consideration. Occidental may only be a partial and
temporary eclipse. But it may also be that shadows are creeping into
Florida's government in the sunshine.
BOB RICE
71. Certainly no valid distinction can be made of the fact that Gradison involved a
citizens committee and Occidentalinvolved a full-time staff: both served as advisory bodies.
The court did not discuss this issue.
72. 351 So. 2d at 342 n.10.
73. Is the court implying by the word "contrast" that Times and Gradisonsomehow travel
different roads on this issue? The cases appear to be in complete harmony.
74. See FLA. STAT. § 286.011(3) (1977).

